While theoretical models predict a decrease in the cost of capital from depositary receipt offerings, the economic benefits of this liberalization have been difficult to quantify. Using a sample of 126 firms from 32 countries and a size and country matched control sample, we document a statistically and economically significant decline in returns of 42 percent. This decline is driven by the pre-announcement diversification potential of the foreign firm. Both these results carry through if we use changes in dividend yields which deliver a decline of 66 basis points in the cost of capital. Indeed, financial market liberalizations have significant economic benefits.
INTRODUCTION
Towards the end of World War II, global markets were characterized by numerous barriers to the free flow of capital. In addition to high taxation and transaction costs, there existed explicit restrictions on foreign ownership, capital mobility, and foreign exchange transactions. Furthermore, equity markets were generally less developed and were often characterized by low liquidity, inadequate regulation, and lax disclosure requirements.
The resulting portfolio suppression had three major consequences 1 . First, self, bank, or group finance were the primary sources of funding. Second, securities markets, especially in the case of emerging economies, were accessible only to the government, their agencies, and large firms. Third, national capital markets were small, inactive, and essentially segmented with domestic investors holding most of the local shares. As a result of these barriers, many firms faced a high cost of capital.
The market reforms and liberalization that began in the developed economies in the 1970s and emerging economies during the second half of 1980s led to the removal of many of the above barriers 2 . The deregulation and the development of local equity markets created conditions conducive to attract foreign portfolio investments (FPIs).
Unlike foreign bank finance, portfolio investors would share investment risk and the returns would be matched with the ability of the debtor to pay. From the perspective of foreign investors, global portfolio diversification offered an opportunity to enhance performance. Overall, the FPIs would provide a new source of capital and internationalize the domestic capital markets. As a result of the subsequent improvements in risk sharing and risk matching, the cost of capital would fall.
While these arguments for capital market liberalization are strong, the resulting large portfolio flows during the 1990s have come under acute scrutiny and at times have been blamed for the 1994 Mexican crisis and the current East Asian problems. This has 1 The concept of portfolio suppression is similar in spirit to the financial market repression of Shaw(1973) and McKinnon(1973) . For details see, Errunza (1979) . 2 Some of the emerging markets, for example, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and India, have a long history and were quite developed in the 1970s compared to the smaller European markets. Indeed, the central bank of Brazil issued the decree law 1401 and the accompanying resolution no. 323 in May 1975 that legalized and provided incentives for foreign portfolio investments in Brazilian securities.
led many policy makers and academics to reassess the benefits and costs of FPIs from the perspective of the recipients 3 . Very recently, Malaysia reimposed capital controls and others are considering similar measures. Indeed, the issue has assumed extreme urgency
given that the welfare of a large segment of the global population is directly affected, with significant consequences for the entire global financial system. Hence, in this paper, we focus on the most important benefit of FPIs, namely, the impact on the cost of capital.
Our analysis differs from past studies in many respects. First, as noted by Stulz (1997) , measuring changes in the cost of equity capital for a market undergoing liberalization is not an easy task. Liberalizations at the market level occur over reasonably long periods, are difficult to date and usually follow or are accompanied by other political, economic, or social reforms. Hence, we analyze changes in equity valuations around market liberalization at the firm level. Specifically, we study the impact of the introduction of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) 4 that provide a one-shot event in which to study the impact of foreign investor participation on the cost of capital. Although the process of integration is gradual at the market level, the introduction of ADR at the firm level should have a relatively discreet effect on the expected return of the firm.
Second, our focus is not solely on documenting the change in cost of capital but also to relate it to the prediction of international asset pricing models (IAPMs) that suggest that the reduction in segmentation premia would be driven by the diversification potential of the foreign firm. Third, our methodology differs greatly from past studies based on standard event-study methodology. Our analysis uses ADR announcement dates as well as a country-size matched control sample. Announcement dates, as opposed to listing dates, allow us to more precisely measure the liberalization effect. The matched sample approach is utilized to respond to benchmarking issues and control for the impact of other liberalization measures. Fourth, we use abnormal returns-based measure to study changes in the cost of capital in the long run (cost of capital hypothesis) as well as around 3 See Stulz(1997) for a detailed discussion of the various issues and the available empirical evidence. 4 Historically, ADRs have played an important role in global finance. Since the 1970's, firms from developed markets (DMs) have used this vehicle to escape the small home market with its limited risk sharing opportunity, raise new capital, enlarge shareholder base, facilitate cross-border mergers and acquisitions and enhance corporate image. More recently, the firms from emerging markets (EMs) have the ADR announcements (segmentation hypothesis). We also report changes in dividend yields as suggested by Bekaert and Harvey (1998) to check the robustness of our results.
Finally, our sample is richer in that it incorporates firms from both the DMs and the EMs with very different historical records and circumstances of liberalizations. This allows for a higher degree of confidence in generalizations based on our results and presents an opportunity to provide initial evidence on the differential spillover effects.
Overall, our results provide strong evidence that market liberalizations decrease the cost of equity capital. Sample firms experience significant decline in long run "steady state" returns. After controlling for the impact of market and other confounding effects, a reduction of 42.2% in the cost of capital is attributable to the ADR introduction. We interpret this as evidence of a super risk premium. We also document positive returns up to and including the announcement of the liberalization (six to one month prior to liberalization and the month of announcement) which are consistent with equity valuations increasing as the cost of capital falls. The statistically and economically significant decline in our measure of the cost of capital is driven by the pre-announcement diversification potential of the foreign firm as predicted by the IAPMs. Both these results hold if we use changes in dividend yields which deliver a decline of 66 basis points in the cost of capital.
Finally, consistent with theoretical expectations, the average impact on the cost of capital for the DM firms is greater than that for the EM firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly describes ADRs.
Section 2 reports the related literature on cost of capital and segmentation hypothesis. In section 3, we examine the impact on expected returns of ADR issuing firms in an international asset pricing framework. Section 4 details the empirical and methodological issues. Section 5 reports data and results. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
ADR BACKGROUND
An ADR is a negotiable certificate issued by a depositary bank for a non-U.S.
security that is held by the depositary's custodian in the home market of the non-U.S.
followed suit with encouragement from their government to use ADRs as an integral part of the external liberalization policy.
Company. ADRs are registered with the SEC and trade like any other U.S. security. 
COST OF CAPITAL AND SEGMENTATION HYPOTHSES

Cost of Capital Hypothesis
Determining the relationship between stock market liberalization and cost of capital is notoriously difficult. As the liberalization process unfolds, realized returns increase as the cost of capital decreases. Therefore, using realized returns to proxy for expected returns is not a straightforward task. A recent study by Bekaert and Harvey (1998) argues that changes in dividend yield can be used to proxy for changes in the cost of capital. Using a cross-sectional time-series model, they study the impact of market liberalizations, introduction of country funds and ADRs and report a decline of five to 90 basis points in the cost of capital following liberalization for a sample of EMs. They focus on the 36 to seven months prior to and four to 34 months after the liberalization to study long run effects. In order to eliminate potential errors in dating of the liberalization, they 
EXPECTED RETURNS AND ADRs
Impact of Introducing an ADR from a Completely Segmented Market
To estimate the change in cost of capital on introduction of an ADR, it is important to postulate the market setting. If we assume that the originating Ith market is completely segmented from the global market, the underlying firm would be priced according to the following pricing relationship:
where E R i ( ) is the expected return on the ith security from Ith national market, R f is the risk free rate, A I is the aggregate risk aversion coefficient for investors from the Ith
Market, M R I I
( ) is the market value (return) of the Ith market portfolio. Thus, the expected return depends on the local price of risk and the national covariance risk.
Upon introduction of the ADR on the global market, the firm would now be priced under complete integration. The world CAPM in the absence of exchange risk would deliver the following pricing relationship
where A is the aggregate world risk aversion coefficient and M R w ( ) is the market value (return) of the global portfolio. Thus, the expected return would depend on the global price of risk and the global covariance risk.
In general, we would expect the global price of risk to be lower than the local price of risk, the world market portfolio to be less volatile than the local market portfolio and the securities to be more correlated within a market than across markets. Hence, the expected return (i.e. cost of capital) of a security from segmented market declines when it issues an ADR that is priced in an integrated market. Note that Henry (1998) comes to a similar conclusion. In a two country framework, he shows that a move from autarky to full integration would result in asset revaluation as a result of changes in discount rates, aggregate risk sharing and expected cash flows. (1995)). We use the mild segmentation model of Errunza and Losq (1985) which captures the impact of a one-way barrier (restricted access) on asset pricing. 7 The barrier is prohibitive in the sense that investors from the Ith market can trade in all assets whereas the other investors are restricted and can trade in only their home assets. In this more realistic setting, the pricing relationship is,
Impact of Introducing an ADR from a Mildly
where R e is the vector of returns on all securities that can be traded by all investors irrespective of their nationality. The expected return on the ith security consists of a global risk premium and a super risk premium, which is proportional to the conditional
In a two-country case, we can view the Ith market as a DM or an EM and the other country as the U.S. market. The vector R e then comprises of all securities that trade on the U.S. market and the conditional market risk depends on the ability of U.S. investors to achieve the benefits of international diversification without having to trade abroad. In effect, the availability of substitute assets on the home market reduce the diversification potential of the ADR firm. If U.S. investors can perfectly mimic returns on the ith foreign security through home-made diversification, (i.e. correlation of one between returns on ith security and its most highly correlated home-made diversification portfolio), then the super risk premium will evaporate. Indeed, the correlation approaches one after the introduction of the ADR since U.S. investors can now mimic the return on the underlying security through home traded ADR. At the other extreme, if the correlation were essentially zero, ceteris paribus, the security i would command a higher expected return to reflect its diversification potential. Thus, the expected return depends on the interaction between access to foreign securities and the diversification potential of the firm.
The decline in expected return, when a firm trading in a mildly segmented market introduces an ADR on the U.S. market, will depend on the correlation between the return on the security and its most highly correlated home-made diversification portfolio during the period preceding the ADR announcement. The higher the correlation, the lower its diversification potential and the lower will be the decline in expected return. We explicitly test this relationship.
EMPIRICAL ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY
Market liberalizations occur gradually and over reasonably long periods. Further, most countries have opened their markets in stages. Stock market liberalizations invariably follow or are accompanied by other political, economic, or social reforms. Informational problems (e.g. asymmetries, rumors), issues of credibility, and the largely political nature of the decision further confound the events. As a result, it is extremely difficult to date liberalizations at the market level. Both Bekaert and Harvey (1998) and Henry (1998) attempt to minimize the impact of imprecise dating through careful data collection and econometric modeling. In this paper we take an alternate route and analyze changes in equity valuations at the firm level. Specifically, we study the impact of the introduction of ADRs that provide a one-shot event in which to study the impact of foreign investor participation on the cost of capital. Although the process of integration is gradual at the market level, the introduction of ADR at the firm level should have a relatively discreet effect on the expected return of the firm. This is because once introduced on a foreign market, the firm would be priced in an international setting regardless of the degree of integration of the originating market as a whole.
Measuring Cost of Capital
Measurement of changes in the cost of equity capital for a market undergoing liberalization is also very difficult. Consistent with the well established empirical literature on tests of the predictions of IAPMs and the segmentation hypothesis, we use abnormal returns-based measure to study changes in the cost of capital in the long run as well as around the ADR announcements. Whereas Henry (1998) uses realized returns, Bekaert
and Harvey (1998) believe the change in dividend yield to be a superior proxy. Hence, we also report changes in dividend yields around liberalizations to check the robustness of our results.
Measuring Abnormal Returns and Benchmarking
To generate abnormal returns, we modify the standard event-study methodology.
Recent studies (Kothari and Warner (1997) , Barber and Lyon (1996a, 1996b) ) find that using a reference portfolio approach yields biased test statistics. They argue that benchmarking performance by a matched firm approach yields well-specified test statistics for detecting long-run abnormal performance. Hence, we use the matched sample long horizon methodology to capture the firm specific segmentation and cost of capital effects around inter-listing.
We use buy-and-hold returns to measure long-run stock price performance.
Conrad and Kaul (1993) and Barber and Lyon (1996a,1996b) show that buy-and-hold returns are appropriate when conducting long-run analyses. We examine returns within various windows around the liberalization, starting 36 months before to 36 months after the date the liberalization is announced. For sample firms which have less than 36 months of pre or post-announcement data, we truncate the buy-and-hold return of those firms and their associated control firms. We benchmark performance by selecting a size and country control (match) firm for each sample firm. 10 The procedure for selecting control firms is as follows: At the beginning of each sample firm's pre-announcement window, we rank all firms in the Datastream International database that do not have a DR program by country and then by market value of equity. We then choose four firms with a market value closest to (two smaller, two larger) the sample firm within the same country. We randomly choose either the larger or smaller firm as the match firm. When a matched firm delists or issues an ADR, we substitute the next firm from the market value pair. Of the 126 firms in our sample, 116 were paired with only one control firm while 10 required two control firms.
We assume that the impact of economic and market reforms on a matched pair of firms will be the same. In effect, the methodology of computing abnormal returns using firms matched on the basis of country of domicile and size allows us to abstract from these influences on equity valuation. 11 Hence, we do not control for various reform factors in estimating the change in cost of capital.
Defining Test Periods
The introduction of ADRs for firms that are not priced in a completely integrated market would result in a lowering of expected returns through reduction in segmentation premia. In a well functioning market with no informational asymmetries or credibility concerns, the price effect should occur on announcement followed by price stabilization and lower cost of capital in the post announcement period. Unfortunately, there is information dissemination (leakage) prior to announcement. In a number of emerging markets, the access to global capital markets is controlled by the government concerned about the impact of foreign investments on the economy, markets, balance of payments, and socio-political climate which may result in an administrative delay of up to six months between the initial firm level deliberations and the actual announcement of an ADR issue.
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It should also be pointed out that in many emerging markets, local investors seem to interpret the expectations of foreign investor interest in a local firm as a strong positive signal. This should result in positive returns leading up to the actual announcement of an ADR offering.
To test the segmentation hypothesis we use a window of six month period preceding the announcement and a six month post-announcement period. This is prudent given the difficulty of capturing the economically relevant timing and the fact that the average time period between the announcement and the listing date is about three months.
We test the cost of capital hypothesis by comparing realized (abnormal) returns over two 30 month periods preceding and following the test period of the segmentation hypothesis.
The difference in these long-run windows should be a measure of the size of the super risk premium and therefore the change in the cost of capital. By defining the test period for the cost of capital hypothesis in this fashion, we do not bias our results in favor of our hypothesis. Indeed, the increased returns during the six month pre-announcement period are attributed to the segmentation hypothesis and do not contribute to a higher realized return (i.e. cost of capital) prior to the ADR announcement.
Proxy for Diversification Potential
We construct the proxy by measuring the return correlation between the ADR firm and its most correlated home-made diversification portfolio over a 30 month period preceding the ADR announcement. We follow Errunza, Hogan and Hung (1998) and 12 For example, in India, under the guidelines announced in May 1994, as reported in May 19,1994 issue of the Financial Times, "the finance ministry has powers to regulate the flow of companies going to the market. Would-be issuers must seek preliminary approval and then return to the ministry for final approval once terms are set." Further, the market not only knows which companies have secured preliminary approval but also which firms are expected (rumored) to seek such permission or attempt to raise funds. In the case of state-owned firms such as banks, a parliamentary bill followed by the Indian president's assent may be necessary. In short, the process preceding an announcement of international offering may include, firm level deliberations, initial discussions with local and foreign investment bankers, the official process involving the finance ministry and at times the parliament with its accompanying press accounts. This is followed by the setting of the terms, final approval, the wait in the queue as managed by the ministry and the market offer.
estimate the most correlated home-made diversification portfolio as the fitted values of the following regression: ADRs are issued on the U.S. market, each country fund is included in the construction of the diversification portfolio and the composition of the equally weighted ADR portfolio changes. Thus, in constructing this measure, we control for market liberalization and spillover effects due to the prior issues of country funds and ADRs. 14 Given data constraints, we had to limit the regressions to a 30 month period preceding the ADR announcement and use monthly observations to ensure adequate trading activity. To preserve degrees of freedom, we use a stepwise regression procedure.
RESULTS
Data and Summary Statistics
The Note that in sharp contrast with previous research based on standard event-study methodology and listing dates, we do not detect abnormal performance in the postannouncement period. The cumulative (annualized) buy-and-hold abnormal return is an country funds and ADRs respectively. We conducted the analysis with only the first country fund and the first ADR. The results are qualitatively the same.
insignificant -3.11 percent (-1.06 percent). However, the finding is consistent with asset pricing models under barriers to capital flows, which predict firms earn a normal rate of return after the liberalization process. Finally, the finding that control firms also experience a similar pattern in equity valuations around liberalization is consistent with Eun et.al.(1993) and Urias (1994) who argue that liberalization benefits "spillover" to other firms in the market 15 .
In summary, we find that realized returns and dividend yields decrease around liberalization, indicating a reduction the cost of equity capital. These results at the firm level are consistent with market level studies. For example, we find a decrease of 42.2 percent in the cost of capital which is similar to a reduction of 39 percent reported by Henry (1998). We find dividend yields decrease by 66 basis points, which is bounded by Bekaert and Harvey's (1998) estimate of 5 to 90 basis points.
Test of the Segmentation Hypothesis
Panel A of table 2 reports returns for the period immediately up to and including the announcement of the market liberalization. Sample firms experience large positive average returns prior to and including the announcement month, which decrease dramatically in the post-announcement period. The buy-and-hold returns for the -6 to 0 month windows are 29.35 percent. The buy-and-hold excess returns surrounding the announcement are 11.65 percent, which is statistically significant at the 5% critical level.
Consistent with Miller (1998) , the abnormal buy-and-hold excess returns during the announcement month are a positive 2.76 percent, which is also significant at the 5% critical level. These results are similar to the findings of Henry (1998) and support the theoretical prediction of equity valuations adjusting upward as the cost of capital falls.
Finally, results based on changes in dividend yields are similar and consistent with results based on realized returns.
Long-Run Performance by Geographic Location
15 When a foreign (ith) security is cross-listed as an ADR, it is now accessible to all investors, and the expected return reflects global risk sharing. To the extent that another foreign (jth) security is correlated with the ADR issuing (ith) firm, the ability of U.S. investors to mimic returns on this other foreign (jth) security (that is not cross-listed) increases. That is, the integrating effects of ADR issuing security spillover to other securities and reduce expected returns for the foreign market. This impact is most
The pattern in pre and post-abnormal performance suggest that firms experience, on average, a significant reduction in returns after cross-listing. If this pattern is due to a reduction in the cost of capital, we might expect the pattern to be more severe in markets that have the largest degree of segmentation. To explore this issue, we first examine returns by market location.
Panel B of Table 3 The results of panel B and C of table 3 illustrate the difficulty noted by Bekaert and Harvey (1995) in using geographic location to proxy for the complex set of capital market restrictions and the degree of market integration that exist at any one point in time.
As noted in section 3, the decline in expected returns depends on the interaction between access to foreign securities and the diversification potential of the firm. Geographic location, in its most simple classification of developed versus emerging markets, is clearly an inadequate proxy of market access. Further, the substitution effect must also be considered. In general, the ADRs have preceded the introduction of country funds in the case of DMs, whereas the country funds have generally preceded the ADRs in the case of EMs. Our results, which suggest a greater impact of ADR introduction on the abnormal returns in the case of DMs relative to EMs, are thus consistent with the importance of the pronounced for the first ADR issue and depends on the return correlation as well as the relative weight of the ADR issuing firm in the foreign market portfolio.
substitution effect. Indeed, in the case of EMs, the spill-over effect of country funds that have preceded the ADR listings have reduced the liberalization impact of ADRs.
Change in Cost of Capital and Diversification Potential
As discussed in section 3, the decline in expected return after cross-listing will depend on the correlation between the return on the security and its most highly correlated home-made diversification portfolio during the period preceding the ADR announcement.
Specifically, we measure the ability of U.S. investors to replicate the returns of the foreign security with domestically traded assets. It is important to note that we form diversification portfolios for each individual firm, rather than at the market level. Because companies from a particular market may already be spanned, either by their inclusion in a country fund or due to spill-over effect of existing ADRs, examining firm level data should provide a more accurate assessment of the segmentation effect at the firm level which is the object of our study. For comparison, Panel B of table 4 reports correlations of the home-made diversification portfolios with the corresponding market index returns. In all cases, we find that the market level correlations are larger in magnitude and have less dispersion, which may lower this measure's explanatory power. Hence, we focus our analysis on correlations at the firm level. Table 5 reports the frequency distribution of factors included in the diversification portfolios. The factor that was chosen most often was the portfolio of ADRs followed by the closed-end country fund from the sample firm's home country. This result is consistent with the findings of Errunza, Hogan and Hung (1998) 6 show that the pattern in dividend yields is similar to that observed using realized returns. As in Panel A, dividend yield decreases monotonically across quartiles, with the exception of quartile three. However, when using quartiles as breakpoints, the dividend yield differences are not statistically significant.
Therefore, we turn to a more powerful test of the relationship between the diversification potential of the firm and changes in the cost of capital.
In the first test, we perform cross-sectional regression analysis for the entire pre to post-announcement period (from-36 to -1 month minus +1 to +36 month) 16 . The results of the regression analysis using unadjusted buy-and-hold returns are presented in table 7.
For all specifications, the coefficient on our correlation measure (CORR) is negative and significant.
17
Regression 2 of table 7 shows that after controlling for the degree of spanning, the firm's location in emerging markets (dummy variable EMERGE that takes on a value equal to 1 if the sample firm is located in an EM) do not have a significant effect on returns. Regression 3 adds a dummy variable (CAPITAL) that takes on the value of one if the ADR raises new equity capital. The coefficient on this capital raising dummy is insignificant. Finally, when the market level correlation measure (CORRML) is included in Regression 4, we see that it has no additional explanatory power. This result is consistent with the univariate results presented in table 6 that suggest that the firm level measure is a better indication of spanning ability. Overall, the results in table 7 suggest that the decline in realized return after cross-listing depends on the diversification potential of the underlying security. Table 8 reports regression results for changes in excess returns around cross-listing. These results are similar to those for unadjusted returns. Specifically, the coefficient on CORR is again negative and significant across all regression specifications.
The second test, reported in Table 9 , shows the multivariate regressions of changes in long-run dividend yields on our independent variables. For each firm, we compute the average monthly dividend yield over the -36 to -7 and +7 to +36 periods. 18 The difference between these two long-run averages is the dependent variable. In all regressions, the coefficient on CORR is negative and significant. Thus, the evidence in Table 9 supports our previous result that the cost of capital after cross-listing depends on the diversification potential of the firm.
Window of Opportunity Hypothesis
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) suggest that managers time new stock offerings to take advantage of "windows of opportunity" to issue overvalued shares.
In our context, there may be similar motives for capital raising ADR firms. Further, to assure listing success that may lead to future successful capital raising issues, the noncapital raising firms may also time their listings following good performance. However, recent evidence by Kato and Schallheim (1992) and Kang and Stulz (1996) demonstrates that managerial incentives may not be homogeneous across countries. These studies document that there is no significant negative abnormal return around the announcement of a public equity offering by Japanese firms. In addition, Foerster and Karolyi (1998b) find that global seasoned equity offerings do not exhibit the post-issuance decline found in the U.S. market. Consequently, the motivation for managerial timing may not hold outside the United States. Nonetheless, in the pre-announcement period, our sample firms do significantly outperform control firms. Therefore, we address this issue further. Second, the pre-announcement period behavior can be attributed to differential segmentation premia among the sample and control firms. Indeed, the average correlation of the most highly correlated home-made diversification portfolio and the sample (control) firms is 0.72 (0.83). Although this is a statistically significant result and may explain a part of the return differential, economically it is not large enough.
Third, with information leakage and insider knowledge at the political, market and firm level, price run-ups during pre-announcement period are likely for firms considered prime candidates for international listing. Based on our current understanding, we did terminate the pre-announcement period for the test of the cost of capital hypothesis six months before the announcement date.
Finally, as suggested in section 4, the political decision to issue an ADR is likely as important as the managerial decision. Indeed, the managers may have the incentive to issue new equity through ADRs when their stock is overvalued. However, as Bekaert and Harvey (1998) suggest, governments may choose to let firms issue ADRs for the first time when it is most advantageous to them, which may be in periods of low stock prices. In addition, they show that the dividend yield measure is accurate if there is timing of the liberalization. Using a Monte Carlo analysis, they find the dividend yield measure is robust to changes in expected returns. We interpret the robustness of our results using dividend yields as further evidence that timing does not explain our findings. However, since the timing issue may manifest itself in both high and low return regimes, our estimates of decline in the cost of capital should be viewed as upper bounds.
CONCLUSION
The introduction of American Depositary Receipts provide a one-shot event in which to study the impact of market liberalization on the cost of capital at the firm level.
When a firm trading in a mildly segmented market introduces an ADR, the decline in expected return depends on the availability of close substitutes on the U.S. market. We use a sample of 126 firms from developed and emerging markets, and a country-size matched sample approach to investigate the cost of capital and the segmentation hypotheses.
We first document the pattern in realized returns around liberalization. We find that in the steady state period before the liberalization (month -36 to -7), firms have large buy-and-hold returns relative to the steady state period after liberalization (month +7 to +36). This pattern of large realized returns preceding the announcement of the liberalization is consistent with segmented markets having a higher risk premium and therefore a higher cost of capital. Second, we find that in the period immediately surrounding the announcement of the liberalization (month -6 to -1 and month 0), equity valuations increase dramatically. This result is consistent with equity valuations adjusting upward as the cost of capital falls. The statistically and economically significant decline in our measure of the cost of capital is driven by the pre-announcement diversification potential of the foreign firm as predicted by the IAPMs. Both these results carry through if we use changes in dividend yields to measure the cost of capital. Finally, consistent with theoretical expectations, the average impact on the cost of capital for the DM firms is greater than that for the EM firms. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that financial market liberalizations have significant economic benefits. 
R it is the return on stock i on the tth month. T i is the number of months from the beginning to end of the performance window. For firms that data is not available for the full three-year pre or post-announcement window, the holding period return is calculated from the first date data is available. For the matching firm sample, the corresponding firm's return is calculated over the same truncated period. If the matched firm delists or issues an ADR, the next closest matched firm's return is used. Dividend yields are monthly averages taken from Datastream. * and ** indicate significance of the signed-rank test at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels, respectively. Table 4 Correlations of diversification portfolio returns with the sample firm returns Firm level correlations are the correlation between the diversification portfolio returns and the sample firm's returns over the -36 to -7 month period. Market level correlations are the correlation between the diversification portfolio returns and the firm's national stock market index returns over the -36 to -7 month period. The diversification portfolio is selected from a value weighted U.S. market index, 12 industrial portfolios, a value weighted portfolio of MNCs, as well as each firm's country funds and equally weighted portfolio of ADRs. 
Table 5 Frequency Distribution of factors included in Diversification Portfolios
Column 2 summarizes the composition of the diversification portfolios based on stepwise regression procedures over 3 broad U.S. indices, 12 U.S. industrial indices, a value weighted portfolio of 30 U.S. traded multinational firms, closed-end country funds from the respective foreign market, and an equally weighed portfolio of ADRs from the respective foreign market. 
R it is the return on stock i on the tth month. T i is the number of months from the beginning to end of the performance window. For firms that data is not available for the full three-year pre or post-announcement window, the holding period return is calculated from the first date data is available. For the matching firm sample, the corresponding firm's return is calculated over the same truncated period. If the matched firm delists or issues an ADR, the next closest matched firm's return is used. Pre-and post-announcement average dividend yields are calculated over the -36 to -7 and +7 to +36 period, respectively. For firms that data is not available for the full pre-or post-announcement window, the average dividend yield is calculated from the first date data is available. Quartile break points from Panel A are used in Panel B. CORR is the correlation of the diversification portfolio returns with the sample returns over the -36 to -7 month period. Buy-and-hold returns are calculated over the -36 to -1 month period. The diversification portfolio is selected from a value weighted U.S. market index, 12 industrial portfolios, a value weighted portfolio of MNCs, as well as each firm's country funds and equally weighted portfolio of ADRs. ** indicates significance at the 5% level using the Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
